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Over the last year, hackers (particularly from Eastern European crime syndicates) have been blackmailing online businesses in an attempt to extort money 
from them. Any company in e-commerce that allows 
acceptance of online payments via credit and debit cards are 
potential targets for hackers. The most common technique 
is the use of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks to 
force retailers and payment providers into protection rackets 
(Leyden, 2003a). Typical DDoS attacks deluge companies 
with requests for information that paralyse web sites for 
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up to 24 hours or more. If they don't pay, they use DDoS 
to bring online sites to a standstill thus causing huge losses 
of revenue. The mechanism of the scam has been known 
for a number of years but the scale of its use has grown 
dramatically in the last 12 months or so. Unfortunately, law 
enforcement agencies do not have time to become involved 
in every DDoS service attack. They are also extremely 
difficult to anticipate. Most of them are nuisance attacks, 
and are not performed by organised criminals. However, if 
accompanied by blackmail threats, it is a clear indication 
that a criminal attack is in progress. 
Nuisance attacks can be just as bad as extortion attempts 
for those in e-commerce. At the end of 2003, WorldPay, 
the Royal Bank of Scotland's online payments service, was 
subject to a three-day orchestrated and sustained DDoS 
attack by unidentified computer criminals (Leyden, 2003b). 
As a consequence, the online payment and administration 
systems were reduced to a trickle due to a flood of traffic 
directed at its Web-based systems. Although the systems 
worked safely and securely throughout the attack, the 
networks around them were systematically flooded with 
requests for the service on a massive computer-generated 
scale. The ability to process payments ended up being 
substantially slower and at lower volumes than normal as 
a result. What was worse for WorldPay was that during 
the attack, other businesses attempted to profit from 
WorldPay's misfortune. For instance, Netbank (among 
others) attempted to poach WorldPay customers by offering 
"emergency services" to allow "e-tailers" to continue to 
trade online (Ledyen, 2003b). 
So how exactly do the criminals carry out DDoS 
attacks? IT experts say hackers most likely use a network of 
compromised hosts in educational institutions (Chaudhary 
and Wood, 2004). A network of infected PCs with Trojan 
horse infiltration tools can target spurious traffic to drown 
out legitimate business on any chosen site. (Tools like 
Stacbeldraht [German for "barbed wire"| and TrinOO 
have been commonly used). These methods have also been 
used in DDoS attacks against Yahoo, Excite and eBay. 
There appears to be little that companies can do up front 
to prevent DDoS attacks being launched against them. 
Avoiding attacks can be difficult because companies are 
bombarded from dozens (or even hundreds) of directions 
at once. Peering arrangements and clever network design 
can also minimize disruption but they are still notoriously 
difficult to defend against. However, the damage is 
dependent on how well prepared an organisation is to 
fend off assaults. When attacks occur, target organizations 
are advised by law enforcement agencies to contact their 
Internet Service Provider immediately to discuss potential 
configuration changes and mitigation techniques. The good 
news is that in many cases, a reasonable level of networking 
connectivity can be maintained. 
More worrying than nuisance DDoS attacks are those 
criminals that use the threat of a DDoS attack to blackmail 
companies. In most instances, criminal hackers appear to 
be targeting high-volume, low-value transactional sites such 
as online bookmakers. The criminal hackers have been 
operating for almost two years from offshore locations 
such as Gibraltar and Antigua. Up until recently they were 
targeting sites mainly used by US gamblers betting on 
sporting events. However, more recently, they have turned 
their attention to British and Australian online based 
bookmakers. Typically, the hackers threaten to disrupt 
and paralyse bookmakers' web sites. Earlier this year, the 
police's National Hi-Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU) started to 
investigate six cases of British Internet bookmakers allegedly-
being blackmailed by hackers threatening to disrupt online 
betting ahead of major sports events such as the Grand 
National, FA Cup final and the European Championship. 
Analysts estimate that the online betting market is worth 
over £3bn per year. For online bookmakers, several hours 
of downtime would be extremely expensive - especially if it 
coincided with an event such as the Grand National, which 
attracts more than £l00m in bets. 
Sites are frequently blackmailed into paying between 
£20,000 and £30,000 a year in return for respite from 
further attacks. The police urge businesses to report such 
instances and not to give into the blackmail demands. 
However, £30,000 a year may be a relatively small amount 
compared to the potential losses so some organizations 
appear to be paying up. For instance, targeted bookmakers 
say the money the criminals ask for is about one hour's 
worth of business (Chaudhary and Wood, 2004). 
The Irish bookmaker Paddy Power (one of the six 
Internet firms targeted) said "They're not really hackers, it's 
more like spammers - they keep logging on so that the site 
slows right down and no one else can get in. It's like putting 
100 people in front of a betting shop to jam up the door" 
(Chaudhary and Wood, 2004). Typically, the online book-
makers were sent an e-mail saying that they had slowed 
the site down and that if the company paid them lots of 
money they would be left alone. Hackers know that DDoS 
attacks cost bookmakers hundreds of thousands of pounds 
in turnover because most gamblers are unable to place bets 
via the Internet because they cannot gain access to them. 
For instance, Paddy Power was targeted on the night of the 
US Super Bowl final and lost a lot of money as the system 
was paralysed for a few hours by a DDoS attack. Most 
bookmakers have now put measures in place with their 
Internet Service Providers to strengthen their defences. 
Thankfully, in July 2004, the NHTCU, in a joint inves-
tigation with the Russian Federation, arrested three key 
members of the Russian gang involved in extortion. The 
success of the operation was built on the foundation of 
international partnerships between law enforcement and 
business. In Russia, the NHTCU worked closely over 
many months with the Investigation Department of the 
Investigative Committee attached to the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs (MVD) and the MVD's computer crimes specialist 
department (World Online Gambling Law Report, 2004). 
The cash was being transferred by a number of money 
transfer agencies who helped the NHTCU track the money 
and thereby identified members of the gang. However, the 
NHTCU have stressed that while bookmakers might be 
under the spotlight now, web-based extortion is a generic 
high-tech crime that has been a problem for some time. 
Therefore, it is clear that the problem of corporate black-
mail is growing and that law enforcement agencies will 
have to work together on a global level if it is ever going 
to be beaten. 
References 
Chaudhary, V. and Wood, G. (2004) "Web bookies held to 
ransom." The Guardian, February 24, p.33. 
I.eyden, J. (2003) East European gangs in online protection 
racket". The Register. Novemher 12, 2003. htrp://www. 
theregister.co.uk/2003/1 l/l 2/east_european_gangsJn_ 
online/ 
I.eyden, J. (2003) "WorldPay recovers from massive attack." 
The Register. Novemher II, 2003. www.theregister. 
co.uk/2003/11/11 /worldpay_recovers_from_massive_a track/ 
World Online Gambling Law Report (2004) Global protection 
racket smashed in joint operation between UK's national hi-
tech crime unit and Russian police. July 21, 2004. vvwvv.e-
comlaw.com/vvoglr/index.asp. 
